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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Docket No. 4&79~-2013
Ada County No. 2012-19714
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO
The Honorable Judge Moody Presiding

Ray M. Nichols,
Appellant

vs:

State of Idaho ,
Respondent

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ITEM

PAGE

Statement of the Case. • • • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • . • • • 1
Issue For Review •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
'Argument of Law ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2

Conclusion •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11
Oath of Appellant ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 13

Table of Authorities •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• II-III

I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ITEM

PAGE

Andre V. Morrow,
106 Idaho 455,
680 P.2d 1355, (1984) ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ballard V. Estelle,
937 F.2d 453, (1991) •••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••. 8
Crist V. Segna,
622 P.2d 1028, (1981) ..•...••..•.•..•.......•....•.••••.......•• 7
Fetterly V. Paskett,
997 F.2d 1295, (1993) ••..•.....•••..••...........•...••.......•. 8
Hicks V. Oklahoma,
447 U.S. 343,
65 L. Ed. 2d 1 7 5, ( 1 9 7 9) •.••..•..•...•........•..••..••.•••.•...•. 8
Lambright V. Stewart,
167 F.3d 477, (1999) ...•••.••..•..•..••........•...•..•...•.•.•. 8
Martinez V. Ryan,
1 3 2 S. Ct. 1 3 0 9 , ( 201 2 ) •••••....••.•...••.•••....•.••...•..•.•.•. 9

Montana Contractors Assn. V. Department of Highways,
715 P.2d 1056, (1986) ••.••..•..•.•..•.••.....••..•..•.•••.•.•.•• 9
Thompson V. Coleman,
501 U.S. 722,
111 s.ct. 2546,
115 L.Ed. 2d 640, (

) • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •9

Troupis V. Summer,
148 Idaho 77,
218 P.3d 1138, (2009) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2
State V. Armstrong,
146 Idaho 372,
195 P.3d 731, (2008) . • • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • • . . . . • • . • . . • . . . . • . 2
State V. Lute,
252 P.3d 1255,

(2011) ...•..••.•...•.......••..•.•.•••..•..•.••.. 6

II

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES,
ITEM

(Con't)
PAGE

State V. McCarthy,
133 Idaho 119,
982 P.2d 954, (1999) ..•.•..•••..••................•••.•...•.... 2
State V. Peterson,
148 Idaho 610,
226 P.3d 552, (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
State v~ Urrabazo,
244 P.3d 1244, (1996) •••••.•..••••....••.• .•...•.••••... ..•..•. 6
Trevino V. Thaler,
1 3 3 S. Ct. 1 911 , ( 201 3 ) .....•..•••.•.•...•.••...•.••...•••....•• 1 2
Fourteenth Amendment to
The United States Constitution •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• PASSIM
Idaho Code 19-2513 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . PASSIM

III

1
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief,

3

and in that Petition, the Appellant raised several issues, anyone

4

of which would have entitled him to relief.

5
6
7

The District Court appointed Counsel to represent the
Appellant during the Post Conviction Process.
The District Court ordered Counsel to prepare and to file

8

a Responsive pleading during the Post Conviction Process, but

9

appointed Counsel refused to do so.

10

The District Court dismissed the Petition for Post

11

Conviction Relief, finding that it was not timely filed, even

12

though the Petition established claims of ineffective assistance

13
14
15
16
17

of Counsel, and

claimed that the District Court lacked subject

matter Jurisdiction to have imposed the sentence that it did.
The Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and
appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender to represent
the Appellant during the Appeal process.
The Office of the State Appellate Defender moved to be

18

allowed to withdraw as the attorney of record, the Idaho State
19

Supreme Court allowed such Motidn2tb withdraw, and the Appellant
20

does now submit this Brief in a Pro-Se format.
21

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
22

A).
23

Did the District Court Err When It Dismissed The
Petition For Post Conviction Relief?

24
25

Opening Brief of Appellant-1

ARGUMENT OF FACTS AND LAW

In the Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the Petitioner

2
3

alleged that he was sentenced illegally, and that an illegal

4

sentence could be corrected at any time.
The District Court disagreed with this holding and entered

5

6
7

an Order dismissing this claim, and dismissing the Petition for
Post Conviction Relief.
The Sentence Imposed Is Illegal And Due Process
Of Law Demands That It Be Corrected.

8

First, a challenge to a Court's subject matter Jurisdiction

9
10

maybe raised at any time during the course of the proceedings,

11

even for the first time on Appeal, and may not be waived by the

12

parties. State V. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 374, 195 P.3d 731,

13
14

733, (2008); State V. McCarthy; 133 Idaho 119, 122, 982 P.2d 954,
957, (1999).
Any order entered without subject matter jurisdiction is

15

oid. Troupis V. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 79, 218 P.3d 1138, 1140,
16

(2009); Andre V. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359,
17

(1984).
18
19

20
21
22

23
24

25

The Appellant was convicted of the offense of Robbery, a
iolation of the Idaho Code, Title 18, Section 6501-6503.
The Punishment for the crime of Robbery is contained within the
Idaho Code, §18-6503,

where it is stated:

§18-6503. Punishment for Robbery.
Robbery is punishable by imprisonment in the State
Prison for not less than five, (5), years, and the
punishment may extend to life.
It is based upon this clear language that the~minimun term

Opening Brief~of Appellant-2

1

for the crime of Robbery is five,

2

for in the statute its elf.

3
4

5
6

7

(5)

years, and it is d~p±cted:

At the time of the imposition of the sentence, the Court
ntered an Order which sentenced the Appellant to a term of
"Fixed" life. This is also called a "Determinate" life sentence,
r "life without the possibility of parole".
The Appellant does not argue that the Court could not have

8

imposed a sentence of "Life" for the crime of Robbery. The entire

9

argument is based upon the belief that the Court did not have the

10

11

Jurisdiction to have "fixed" the Life sentence.
The ability to "fix"

or to make "Determinate"

any part

12

of a sentence is contained within the Unified Sentencing Act,

13

which is codified at §19-2513.

14

Under the Unified Sentencing Act, the Determinate portion

15

of a criminal sentence is considered to be the minimum term,

16

during which the criminal defendant is not eligible for parole

17
18

r any type of sentence reduction for "Good-time".
However, not all criminal Statutes are able to have the

19

minimum or determinate terms entered by the Court. Some criminal

20

Statutes carry within them a pre-set minimum term. Robbery is

21
22
23

one of those criminal Statutes.
When a Court is sentencing a criminal defendant under the
Unified sentencing act.for a crime that carries a pre-set
minimum term in the statute itself, the sentencing Court must

24

use the second paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act, which:
25

is located at §19-2513.

Opening Brief of Appellant-3

§19-2513. Unified Sentence, (Second Paragraph) States:

1

If the offense carries a. mandatory minimum penalty
as provided by Statute, the Court SHALL specify a
minimum period of confinement consistent with such
Statute •••••

2
3
4

This paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act uses the

5
6

ord SHALL to command a Court in what it must do. In this case a

7

ourt shall specify a minimum period of confinement consistent

8

ith such Statute.
The Statute in question is Robbery, and it carries within

9

Statute a five,

(5) year minimum period of confinement.

10

Because the Statute carries within it a minimum period of
11

onfinement, the Court must specify a minimum period,

(or fixed

12

erm), which is consistent with the minimum period of confinement
13

pecified in the Statute. In this case it is five,
14
15

16
17

(5), years.

So, when the Court ordered the Appellant to be sentenced
to a term of life, and then ordered that the entire term of life
be made fixed or determinate, the Court violated the Unified
Sentencing Act's second paragraph.

18

Not all criminal Statutes in the State of Idaho carry a

19

minimum term within theistatutes themselves. For instance, the

20

crime of Aggravated Battery is punishable by a term of

21

imprisonment of fifteen (15), years. There is no mention of a

22

minimum period of confinement mentioned in the statute, and for

23

this reason it is the first paragraph of the Unified Sentencing

24

25

Act that a Court must use when imposing a sentence fof~the drime
of Aggravated Battery, and the Court can fix any or all of the
term.

pening Brief of Appellant-4

1

But, because the crime of Robbery,

(For which the Appellant

2

was sentenced), carries within the Statute a minimum period of

3

confinement, the Unified Sentencing Act mandates that the set

4

minimum period of confinement, (Fixed_term), be consistent with

5

the minimum term as set by the statute. Please see, §19-2513,

6
7
8

9

second paragraph.
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, the Eleventh
Edition, explains the term Consistent as follows:
Consistent: Free from variation; Tending to be true and
close to the meaning of an item; Showing
steady conformity.

10
11

However, that is not really important because we all know

12

what consistent means. In this case consistent means that the

13

Court at the time the sentence was pronounced should have entere

14

a fixed term that was in some way consistent to the five,

15
16

(5),

year minimum term as was set by statute. It is clear and it is
not even remotely disputable that a term of fixed life is not
consistent with a five,

(5) year term.

17

In the State of Idaho, when a criminal Statute carrie§
18

within the Statute a minimum term, then, under the Unified
19

Sentencing Act, Paragraph 2, the Court SHALL orde~ the Fixed
20
21
22

term to be consistent with the minimum term as stated in the
Statute. This leaves the Court the complete discretion to order
a maximum term as the court feels to be just and fair for that

23

particular case, but this shall be ordered as the indeterminate

24

term, and not "Fixed".

25

Opening Brief of Appellant-5

1

In light of these plain facts, it is absolutely clear that

2

when the Court imposed a sentence of. "Fixed Life", (Life without

3

the possibility of Parole), upon the Petitioner, the court lacked

4

the ability to' impose such a sentence. The Court Lacked Subject

s matter Jurisdiction.
6

The Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho, in the case of

7

State V. Peterson, 148.Idaho 610, 226 P.3d 552, (2010), Staed as

8

fo,llows:

9

" ••• Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised
by any party at any time, and can not be waived"

10
11

This was also the Holding of the Idaho state supreme court

v.

12

in the case of State

13

Court held as follows:

14

15
16

Lute, 252 P.3d 1255, (2011), where the

" •• Judgments and Orders made without subject
matter jurisdiction are void, and are subject to
collateral attack •••.•• subject matter jurisdiction
can never be waived or consented to, and a Court
has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subjec
matter jurisdiction".

17
18

19
20

This above holding was cited in Lute, Supra, based upon
the holding of State

v.

Urrabazo, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248-1249, (1996.

The subject matter jurisdiction to impose any particular

21

sentence in a criminal case, is contained within the statute it's

22

self. The crime for which the Petitioner stands convicted of,

23

Robbery, is punishable by a sentence of five years,

24

indeterminate life. No where in the Statute does it speak in

25

terms of a "Fixed Life'' term being able to be imposed.
Opemi.:n:g Brief of Appellant-6

(5), to an

1

''Legislative intent must first be determined from the plain

2

meaning of the words used, and, if the plain meaning is direct

3

and certain, and it is unambiguous, the Statute speaks for

4

itself". Crist V. Segna, 622 P.2d 1028, (1981).

s

"It is well established that a Court must give meaning and

6

effect to all Statutory provisions". Montana Contractors Assn.

7

V. Department of Highways,

8

9
10

11

12

The intent of the Legislature when it passed the Unified
Sentencing Act is clear and unambiguous. The Statute speaks for
itself. In the second paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act,
it is stated,
§19-2513,

(Second Paragrapµ)

If the offense carries a mandatory minimum
penalty as provided by Statute, the Court shall
specify_a minimum period of confinement
consistent with such statute.

13
14

15

715 P.2d 1056, (1986).

The only thing this Court need to look to is whether or

16

not the Appellant is convicted of an offense which Statute

17

carries a minimum period of confinement within that Statute, and

18

if the Appellant has been given a minimum period of confinement

19

which is not consistent with that Statute then his sentence is

20
21

22

illegal and is subject to correction at any time.
The Appellant is convicted of the offense of Robbery, in
the Statute for the punishment of the crime of Robbery, there is
a minimum penalty provided for in that Statute. It is a five,(S),

23

year period.
24

Because the Appellant was given a minimum period of
25

confinement of "Fixed Life", his sentence is illegal, as it is

Opening Brief of Appellant-7

1

not "consistent" with the minimum period of confinement was

2

the legislature depicted for in the punishment for Robbery,; and

3

as is provided for in the second paragraph of the Unified

4

Sentencing Act for such crimes that carry a minimum period in

5

the statute.
Because the Court did not follow the statutory commands

6
7

as depicted for b¥ the Legislature of the State of Idaho, the
Court has denied to the Appellant Due Process of Law under the

8

United states Constitution, Amendment Fourteen~
9

"The failure of a State to follow it's own statutory
10

commands may implicate a liberty interest protected by the
11
12

13
14

15

Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause". Fetterly V. Paskett,
997 F.2d 1295, (9th Cir. 1993); Ballard
453,

v.

Estelle, 937 F.2d

(9th Cir. 1991); Lambright V. Stewart, 167 F.3d 477, (9th

Cir. 1999).
Paraprased, "a State's failure to follow it's own laws,

16

violates the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause" Hicks V.

17

Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 65 l.Ed.2d 175, (1979).

18

In this case, the State of Idaho failed to follow the

19

clear and mandatory language of the Unified Sentencing Act, at

20

the second paragraph, and when it failed to follow those madates,

21

22
23

it denied to the Appellant Due Process of Law by imposing a
sentence that is not authorized by law, and is illegal.
The District Court, when it dismissed the Petition for
Post Conviction Relief, also erred and denied to the Appellant

24

the ability to correct this issue.
25

Furthermore, the Appellant raised a valid claim of

pening Brief of Appellant-a

1

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, in that Counsel should have

2

known the difference between

3

of Life Without Parole, or a "Fixed

a

sentence of Life, and a sentence
Life" term.

A valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be

4

5

used as a ;;gateway" to over-come a procedure bar to having such

6

claims heard by a reviewing court. P~ease see, Martinez v. Ryan,

7

132

8

501 U.S. 722, 111

s.ct.

1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272, (2012), Thompson

s.ct.

2546,. 115 L.Ed. 2d 640, (

v.

Coleman,
}.

9

And, finally, it was the Court who imposed the Sentence upon

10

the Petitioner who has violated Due Process of Law when the Court

11

first,

12

informed the Petitioner that the maximum possible sentence that

13

he was facing, was a term of life; and then this same Court, who

14

at the time of the imposition of the sentence, stated, " ••• I'll

15

go one better, .(when the state sought a sentence ot 20 to life),

16

then imposed a sentence of :'determiante life", which is a term of

17

"Fixed Life" or life without the possibility of Parole.

at

the arraignment, and at the initial appearance, who

18

This action in and of it self violates the fundamental

19

principles of Due Process of Law, and fundamental fairness upon

20

which our country was founded, and violates the Sixth Amendment

21

to the United states Constitution.

22

The order of this court, which stated that this case would be

23

dismissed within 20 days, if the Petitioner did not show cause

24

as to why it should not be dismissed, seems to over-look the fact

25

that there is no time limitations in which to challenge the

Opening Brief of Appellant-9

Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Court.

1

The District Court, appointed Counsel to assist the

2

3

Appellant in the Post Conviction Petition. The Court also ordered

4

that Counsel to file an Amended Petition, and to respond to the

5

Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
That Counsel, Randall Barnum, refused to comply with the

6

Order of the Court, and instead rendered ineffective assistance

7

of Counsel when he refused to litigate to the District Court
8

the issues raised in the Petition for Post Conviction Relief,
9

such as ·are listed herein:
10
a).

That the Sentencing Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to impose a fixed life sentence
for the crime of robbery;

b).

Trial Counsel was ineffective for not properly
investigating this case prior to Trial;

C) •

Trial Counsel was ineffective for not
challenging the photo-line up of suspects,
when I was the only individual shown to
the witnesses;

d).

Trial Counsel was ineffective for not p~rsuing
any form of plea bargain with the State;

e).

Denial of Due Process of Law when the Court,
at my Arraignment, informed me that I faced a
sentence of LIFE. Not a sentence of Fixed Life,
which is clearly more than a Life sentence.

11
12

13
14

15
16
17

18
19

I asked Mr. Barnum, who was appointed to represent me in

20

21

the Post Conviction case, about these claims, and he informed me

22

that, " ••• claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can not be

23

filed outside of any timelimitations, and that the case of
artinez

24
25

v.

Ran, 132 s.ct.1309, (2012),

exception to the holding of Thompson
(

v.

did not make an
Coleman, 501 U.S~-722,

), no matter what I had read. I also raised these claims:

pening Brief of Appellant-10

1

f).

2
3

4
5

I believe that my Trial counsel was ineffective to
not informing me that I faced a FIXED LIFE term,
and not just an indeterminate life term.

g). ·r believe that I ·was denied my right to the
effective assistance of counsel during the direct
appeal process, because' appellate c"ounsel did not
speak to me regarding the issues or mistakes made
during trial, or what issues I wanted to raise in
the direct appeal.

6

h).
7

a·

i).

I believe that Appellate counsel was ineffective
for not seeking a Petition for Rehearing in the
Idaho state Supreme court.

j).

I believe that Appellate Counsel was ineffective
for not informing the Petitioner of the fact that
a decision had been reached by the Idaho· State
Court of Appeals, which would have started.the
time limit for filing a Petition For Post Cbnviction
Relief, and or a Federal Petition For a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.

k).

I believe that counsel was ineffective for not
filing a Motion for a sentence reduction under
Idaho Criminal Court Rule 35.

1).

I believe that Counsel was ineffective-for not
making a challenge on appeal, to the length of my
sentence.

m).

I have been denied Due Process of taw because I
·was never given a copy of the discovery material
in my case, which prevented me from making a
decision as to going to trail, trying to make~
plea agreement; furthermore, the action of not
giving me a copy of my discovery material has also
prevented me from researching issues to be raised
on appeal.

9

10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17
18·
19

20
21
22
23

I believe that Appellate Counsel was ineffective
for not raising on direct appeal, a claim of trial
counsel being ineffective.

Mr. Barnum did not believe that there was any type of

24- :merit• to these claims norwould he argue them for me. The

25 fcouit· made it clear that she expected a claim to b~ raised

Opening Brief of Appellant-11

-. '

against Mr. Barnum for being Ineffective in this case because
2

3
4
5

he had not filed any type of documents to assist the Appellant.
The Appellant also now raises two additional claims as
follows:
aa).

That Post Conviction Counsel, Randall Barnum,
Was Ineffective for not performing ANY Court
ordered responses, nor investigating this case;

bb).

That the Appellant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel when the Office of the
State Appellate Defender refused to litigate
this case on appeal.

6
7
8

CONCLUSION

9
10

Pending before this Court is a sister case under number

11

40830, which raises the exact same issue as presented to the

12

Court in this case.

13
14
15

The Appellant believes that it was error for this Court
to not consolidate the cases together into one appeal as the
Office of the State Appellate defender does not have a competent
argument on appeal, and the Appellant pro-se certainly does.

16

The Office of the State Attorney General has now made a
17

concession that the cases of Martinez V. Ryan, 132 s.ct. 1309,
18

(2012); and Trevino V. Thaler, 133 s.ct. 1911, (2013), apply to
19

the State of Idaho.
20
21

Based upon these two cases, there is an exception to the
procedural time bar for claims of ineffective assistance of ,

22

Counsel, and it was error for the district court, and for Mr.

23

Barnum not to have recognized this exception and litigated the

24

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to the Court.

25

Opening Brief of Appellant-12

1

It is clear that the sentence which was pronounced upon

2

the Appellant is not provided for by Statute. Just as clear, the

3

crime of Robbery is one of the crimes which carries within itsel

4

a minimum term.iThese crimes are the ones which are specifically

5

named in the second paragraph of §19-2513.

6
7

8

Because the State of Idaho did not following the mandatory
language of §19-2513, 9Second Paragraph), when it sentenced the
Appellant, the sentence imposed is illegal and must, as a matter
of law and justice, be corrected.

9

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Court
10

enter an Order which directs the District Court to re-sentence
11

the Appellant in conformity to the Unified Sentencing Act, which
12

is codified at §19-2513. (Second Paragraph).
13

OATH OF APPELLANT
14

Cornes now, Ray M. Nichols, the Appellant herein, who does
15
16
17

Declare, under the United States Code, Title 28, Section 1746,
that the enclosed Brief is true and correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief.

18

ant Pro-Se
19

20
21

22
23

24
25

Opening Brief of Appellant-13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Comes now, Ray M. Nichols, the Appellant herein, who does
certify that he served a true and correct copy of the enclosed
Opening Brief of Appellant upon the parties entitled to such
service by depositing a copy of the said same in the United States
Mail, first class postage pre-paid and addressed as follows:
Clerk of the Court
Idaho State Supreme Court
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
83720-0010

Office of the Att. Gen.
Att: L.LaMont Anderson
Post Office Box 83720
Boise, Idaho
83720-0101

1-Jt::I//
Dated

